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Donald J. Puchala 
Raymond F. Hopkins
1
The history of every modern country includes an account of how 
agricultural change occurred. The forces that stimulated rural 
populations to adopt new farming techniques or to abandon the land for 
urban societyiiave also stirred major political struggles. In each country 
the struggle for advantage in the countryside presents unique factors; 
but in each this struggle—over control of land or the income from its 
product—has had important consequences for the values, stability, and 
form of politics of the country. Today, the politics of agriculture in the 
less-developed countries turn on issues of access to land and control of 
credit, markets, or other economic relationships.
This volume brings together a group of essays that review salient 
aspects of agricultural change in particular countries. Even though the 
essays vary in tone, emphasis, and historical or geographical scope, all 
address similar questions; What role has government generally, and 
particular government politics specifically, played in the success or 
failure of agricultural modernization? What political forces has the 
agricultural sector unleashed, and under what circumstances? Overall, 
how has the chosen path of agricultural modernization in each case 
reflected colonial or national politics; and how, in turn, has this affected 
national politics?
Our fundamental purpose here is to provide case studies of 
agricultural modernization that emphasize the political aspects and 
ingredients of development. In doing this we seek to complement the 
literature of agricultural economics as applied to rural development. 
Theoretical and technical writings on agricultural modernization are 
voluminous; the better known recent works are sound, sophisticated, 
enlightening, and basic to our understanding of development.* 
Nonetheless, many of those who approach problems of rural 
development from agronomic and economic perspectives pay scant 
attention to politics and government and their roles in agriculture. Such
1
2 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins
underemphasis frequently renders analysis incomplete, since public 
policies toward agriculture influence prices, investment, planting 
decisions, marketing strategies, land tenure patterns, crop mixes, 
imports and exports, and rural incomes in every country of the world. 
Understanding the origins, contents, and impacts of such policies, then, 
must be fundamental to understanding agricultural development. Even 
more important, analyses of development that omit the influence of 
political factors can become theoretical exercises offering little guidance 
in practical problem solving. For example, development proposals that 
call for utilizing market forces and matching supply to demand via 
prices utilize impeccable economic logic. But such prescriptions border 
on fantasy where government policies regulate commodity and food 
prices to serve ends other than agricultural development, where they 
encourage uneconomic factor mixes for political reasons, or where they 
ration capital for industrialization and thereby inhibit rural investment. 
Similarly, agronomic prescriptions that anticipate higher yields from 
better seeds, more fertilizer, and adequately proportioned water are 
obviously sound. Yet they become practicable only under conditions 
where information inputs and capital are accessible to rural populations 
who have been appropriately educated and motivated to innovate. 
Whether such conditions exist is largely a function of government 
policy and administrative capacity, and these, in turn, result from 
political considerations that often have little to do with agriculture as 
such.
The Meaning of Rural Modernization
Rural modernization is a complex phenomenon. Although its modes 
have varied considerably throughout history, and presently vary from 
region to region, certain general outcomes signal its occurrence. First, 
agricultural production and productivity increase substantially as 
modernization proceeds. Enhanced productivity tends to be especially 
marked with regard to labor and land, and these increases are most 
frequently the results of changing technology, the second general 
feature of agricultural modernization. Even though the extent and 
impacts of technological change differ from country to country, 
sustained development eventually requires technological change in all 
cases.
More broadly conceived, rural modernization is an aspect of the 
structural transformation of economies, a step in the progression that 
has led countries and peoples from traditional feudal agrarianism to 
modern urban industrialism.^ During modernization, labor moves from
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agriculture to industry as heightened productivity and improved 
marketing and distribution systems make it possible for those fetv 
working in the countryside to feed the many working in the cities. 
Concurrently, the farmers’ greater participation in the cash economy 
combines with escalating demand for their products to produce a 
heightened rural well-being, an increase in disposable income, and an 
enhanced demand for both agricultural inputs and consumer goods. 
Rural demand stimulates urban industry, and reinvested profits 
promote further industrial growth, thus creating new urban employ­
ment, new demands for food, and further incentives to agriculture. Of 
course it is a simplification to believe that national economic 
development and industrialization result solely or even primarily from 
the rising interdependence of rural and urban demand. But this is not 
the point. Rather, what is important here is that structural transforma­
tion, as reflected in shifting linkages between sectors, is both a result and 
an index of rural modernization.
Many features of rural modernization are readily observable in the 
statistical series and quantitative records of countries. Table 1.1, for 
example, highlights the rural modernization of several countries in 
terms of production, productivity, input technology, and structural 
transformation. Equally relevant and revealing would be figures 
showing that, typically, during or after agricultural modernization 
rural wage rates move in tandem with urban ones, rural unemployment 
and underemployment diminish (partly through migration), rural 
literacy and education levels rise notably, rural savings and capital 
increase, and living standards markedly improve, at least for the 
“successful” farmers. Also, while some of the rural populace are gaining 
these advantages, others are losing out—squeezed off the bud or 
impoverished as new technologies and government policies disadvan­
tage them.
There are other aspects of rural modernization that are less 
quantifiable, but certainly important. For one thing, “successful” 
peasants typically become farmers during modernization—much more 
an attitudinal or psychological transformation than a physical one. 
With this comes a new attentiveness to markets and a new receptivity to 
innovation, new expectations concerning economic and social mobility 
within and between generations, new openness to information, a 
penchant for organization, and, usually, a heightened and more effective 
political participation. In addition, traditional fatalism in the 
countryside tends to give way to awareness and confidence in science 
applied to agriculture. Parochialism diminishes as modern transport
TABLE 1.1
AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
United States, Japan, Denmark and France, I88O-I96O
______________________ 1960=100_____________________
Country 1880 1900 1910 1930 1950 i960
A. Total Production
United States 29 46 48 60 84 100
Japan 28 42 53 69 71 100
Denmark 2H 31 41 66 76 100
France 47 53 62 60 100
B. Output Per Male Worker
United States 15 18 19 25 52 100
Japan 22 34 43 57 57 100
Denmark 22 30 36 51 67 100
France 22 24 28 40 47 100
C. Output Per Hectare
United States 63 62 63 69 81 100
Japan 36 49 57 71 73 100
Denmark 26 33 1)1) 64 67 100
France 43 47 50 60 62 100
D, Percent Male Workers in Non-Agrlculture
United States 45 57 64 74 85 91
Japan 21 35 43 57 60 74
Denmark 46 53 55 62 77 77
France 51 56 60 67 NA 80
Source: Yujlro Hayaml and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An Internatlqnal
Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) ,PP ■ 327-331 •
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and communications obviate rural isolation; Lifestyles in the country­
side become more secular, urbane, and comfortable as material and 
intellectual poverty recede.^ In many aspects the American farmer 
approximates this ideal, as described by Hadwiger and Talbot in 
Chapter 2.
What parts do politics and public policy play in the course of such 
“typical” rural modernization? What roles do public policy and the pol­
icy process play in initiating and nurturing the economic, social, and 
attitudinal transformations involved in evolution from primitive to 
modern agriculture? Conversely, when, how, and why does public pol­
icy, either by commission or omission, hinder, divert, or stifle such 
transformations? These are the central substantive concerns of our book 
and the main themes of the collected essays that compose it. Readers will 
discover, however, that few pat and simple answers emerge to questions 
about government’s role in agricultural modernization, mainly because 
experiences are so varied and complex. There is no ready formula for 
agricultural development, no universally reliable policy guideline, no 
widely prescribable doctrine of innovation and reform, no superior 
ideology of development. Agriculture has been modernized with a low 
degree of governmental intervention, as in the United States, and with a 
high degree, as in Japan.^ It has also floundered under a low degree of 
intervention, as in India during the First and Second Five Year Plans, 
and under a high degree, as in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.* Similarly, 
agriculture has been admirably developed under capitalist systems, as in 
North America and Western Europe, and under socialist ones, as in the 
People’s Republic of China and Cuba.® But modernization has also 
lagged under both systems, as evidenced by Brazil and Poland.^ Land 
redistribution has furthered development in countries like Taiwan; it 
was relatively inconsequential in Chile, and it probably set back devel­
opment in nineteenth century Ireland and in present-day Bolivia.®
Analyzing Rural Modernization Policies
Methodologically, this book is a set of exercises in the comparative 
analysis of agricultural modernization policies. Those engaged in these 
exercises begin by assuming that policy outcomes range along a 
continuum from “success” to “failure,” although the criteria for such 
judgments vary widely. Even the seeming “success” of American 
agricultural modernization has been challenged recently for its excessive 
resource depletion, capital-intensiveness, and environmental pollution, 
as Hadwiger and Talbot note in Chapter 2. Young Kihl finds a success in 
the declining food self-sufficiency of Korea (see Chapter 6), while a 
similar decline in Iran seems a failure to Schulz (Chapter 7). Even the
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critique of tractor policy in Pakistan offered by Herring and Kennedy 
(Chapter 8) indicates debate and ambiguity over the employment and 
production effects of tractor subsidization, although the effects on 
income distribution clearly enhance inequalities.
Aside from divergency in evaluating outcomes, we will see from our 
analyses that outcomes are shaped at different times and places by a 
combination of factors that we shall term “policy components.” In other 
words, they are shaped by the contents of policies. Analyzing a particular 
government’s policy consists in identifying and accounting for the 
components of its attitude and actions toward its rural sector either 
consciously or inadvertently. Evaluating that policy means assessing the 
appropriateness of the various components (singly or in combination) 
under prevailing geographic, social, economic, political, and cultural 
conditions, and studying their effects on agricultural production, rural 
life, and the political role of agricultural groups.
Policy components assume specific forms and are of great variety and 
uncertain duration in the modernization process of different countries, 
yet standard classification is possible. All development policies, for 
example, are directed toward explicit and/or implicit goals; all prescribe 
a degree of official intervention into agricultural markets; all embody 
means or modes of execution; all concern the allocation of resources; all 
establish or suppress institutions of various kinds. Each of these 
classifications warrants some elaboration.
The Goals and Priorities of Agricultural Policy
Generally speaking, agricultural modernization is most readily 
furthered by agricultural policy when modernization is the goal of such 
policy. Ironically, this has not always been (nor is it presently) the case. 
In some countries governmental attitudes toward the countryside and its 
inhabitants reflect indifference to rural modernization; in other 
countries policies toward agriculture reflect governmental preoccupa­
tions with development in other sectors. For both the Soviet Union and 
the People’s Republic of China priorities in agricultural policy have 
revolved around ideological aims at creating “new socialist men”; 
ideological socialization ranked as more important than productivity or 
production, as Bernstein notes in Chapter 4. India’s agricultural policy 
under the First Five Year Plan set goals of nation-building and 
integrating above rural development. Iran subordinates development to 
regime maintenance. Japan’s aspirations for Taiwanese agriculture 
during the colonial period had a good deal more to do with imperial 
integrity than with rural modernization (see Chapter 5). The point is 
that governmental goals in agricultural policy vary: some pursuits aid 
modernization, and others clearly hamper it.
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Acceptability of Market Structures and Processes
In some countries agricultural development has been encouraged by 
official reliance on market forces as the means and motors of 
development—that is, the logic of supply and demand, the efficiency of 
giving production cues with prices, and the simplicity of adjustment 
and transformation via open competition. In such cases public policies 
have mandated government intervention in economic intercourse only 
to protect property, legalize contracts, standardize weights and mea­
sures, or occasionally control abuses and negative effects of the market 
(see Bates, Chapter 9, on negative externalities). In great contrast, 
agricultural development in some other countries has been conditioned 
so widely by public intervention that the effect has been complete 
suppression of market forces. Under such regimes, market structures are 
replaced by administrative ones, and market dynamics are superseded by 
plans, production directives, and rationing schemes. Obviously, the 
great majority of development regimes fall somewhere between high 
reliance on market forces, as in early America, and comprehensive 
regulation, as in the Soviet Union.^ The Japanese development 
experience, for example, has rather elegantly interwoven market forces 
and administrative controls.*® The important analytical point is that the 
degree and utility of reliance on free markets embodied in rural 
development policies do not vary by accident among national cases, and 
the analyst should therefore be attentive to the reasons for and 
appropriateness of market versus nonmarket emphases under varying 
conditions.
Means Adopted to Pursue Policy Goals
Again, the array of ways that governments have gone about pursuing 
their ends in agriculture, including modernization, is extensive. Some 
have emphasized fiscal manipulation, as in Brazilian attempts to force 
heightened productivity by raising land taxes.** Financial means, too, 
have been used in a variety of ways to channel public funds into forming 
an infrastructure, subsidizing inputs, prices, and incomes, compensat­
ing expropriated landowners, providing credit, furthering research and 
extension services, and educating farm families. In countries such as 
Cuba and China where agricultural modernization has been only an 
aspect of broader programs of rural improvement, public funds have 
also been directed into health, recreational, cultural, and educational 
facilities intended ultimately to enhance the human resources invested 
in agriculture.*^
The primary legislative means to furthering agricultural moderniza­
tion in a great many countries has been the land reform law, in which
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there is great variety. A number of land reforms have been punitively 
directed and draconically enforced against larger landholders, some­
times under the banner of heightened efficiency, sometimes out of 
intentions to eliminate aliens and absentees, and sometimes as unabashed 
campaigns of class warfare in the countryside. In this latter regard, Stalin’s 
drive against the kulaks is notorious.'* As noted earlier, there 
are few general lessons to be drawn from experience with land 
reform and its relation to agricultural modernization. As an agri­
cultural policy, many governments, especially in Latin America, 
still continue to look at adjusting land tenure, however, as the 
final step toward rural improvement. The policy analyst’s task 
is to determine what kinds of land reform best contribute to 
rural modernization and what kinds are least productive.
Border controls and foreign relations are also means that serve rural 
development ends. In some cases where conditions are propitious, 
governments find that integrating their agricultural sector or parts of it 
with the world economy supports internal development; in other 
instances, isolating agriculture has been a preferred strategy. Where cash 
crops for export are important sources of development capital, as with 
many coffee, cocoa, sugar, and cotton producing countries, export taxes 
and foreign policies aimed at stable markets and enhanced earnings are 
bound to development programs that rely on exchange earnings for 
financing, as in Ghana (see Bates, Chapter 9). On the other hand, where 
unreasonable foreign competition, in grains or processed food, for 
example, threatens bankruptcy even to efficient local farmers, tariff 
protection and consequent insulation from the world economy beccJme 
ingredients of planning for rural development. Interestingly, almost 
every country that has experienced rural modernization passed through 
a high tariff period during initial and middle phases of development. 
Other ways in which foreign policy means serve rural modernization 
ends typically include relying on external markets for agricultural 
inputs, looking to more advanced countries, multinational firms, and 
international organizations for information and technology, and 
seeking development capital from abroad (as does Iran, see Chapter 6). 
Remarkable strides toward rural modernization in Taiwan and South 
Korea, and in Israel as well, can be attributed in considerable measure to 
American public and private development assistance.'^ But then too a 
measure of early American agricultural growth also followed from 
overseas investment.'* Finally, while there is controversy about the 
efficacy of foreign food aid as a stimulant to rural development, some 
governments have managed to integrate aid into modernization
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programs in an imaginative way—in the form of “food-for-work” on 
rural infrastructure projects, or as “crop insurance” to encourage 
experiments with new technologies.*®
Development in the countryside does not usually occur spon­
taneously. People generally do not change their modes of living and 
livelihood, even when desperate, until they are convinced that change 
will either bring rewards or avoid punishments. The task of executing 
policies aimed at change therefore involves governments in the search 
for appropriate administrative instruments. Styles of official promotion 
and enforcement during rural modernization range from gentle urging 
to brutal coercion, although, typically, incentives and enticements are 
preferred over sanctions. The Chinese government continues to rely 
rather heavily, though hardly exclusively, on symbols and propa­
ganda-slogans, campaigns, wall posters, verbal exhortation, exem­
plary behavior, and the like—and the Indian government has also used 
such methods with some effect.*’
Many governments direct their market interventions at providing 
incentives for innovation, for instance in cases where genetically supe­
rior seeds are publicly subsidized and fertilizers are distributed 
below cost to encourage their adoption. Some governments, such as the 
Japanese, have effectively mobilized rural elites and farmers’ organiza­
tions to lead modernization drives. Still others, like the Chinese 
nationalist government, have linked their agricultural extension 
services with their gendarmerie to monitor compliance with official 
policies (see Chapter 5 on Taiwan), and elsewhere, in a few cases, 
development goals have been enforced by imprisoning or executing 
recalcitrant peasants.
Origins and Allocation of Resources for Development
No policy can help attain goals without resources, and experience in 
many countries reveals that rural modernization requires substantial 
investments of time, energy, intellect, and money. The origins of 
resources for agricultural development, however, differ considerably 
over time and space. In North America and in some European countries 
and their colonies, investing in rural development was, by and large, a 
private-sector undertaking. Opportunities were signalled by expecta­
tions of high return; initiative followed from individual entrepreneur- 
ship; capital came from private institutions and was granted to the state 
from a stock of uninhabited or expropriated property. Early public 
investment in these cases ~was limited to supporting research and 
sometimes funding the development of infrastructure (although in
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North America even infrastructure was privately financed and 
engineered until well into the twentieth century). The official policy, if 
it can be called that, was to promote the uninhibited operations of 
private capital markets by interfering as minimally as possible.
Elsewhere, of course, the origins of resources for development were to 
be found in the public sector—planning and administration became, 
surrogates for entrepreneurship; ministries of development or rural 
reform and marketing boards replaced private financial institutions and 
commodity exchange; and fiscal receipts served the function of private 
savings. Policy under these conditions embodies an orchestration of 
fiscal means, revenue needs, and anticipated costs of development 
strategies. In instances where public revenues turn out either inadequate 
or unreliable, governments may choose to finance development through 
domestic inflation, as Brazil did during the 1960s, or through foreign 
borrowing, as Peru, Sudan, and other countries in Asia and Africa have 
done in recent years.'* Ultimately, there is no “better” or “poorer” way 
to finance rural modernization, since much depends on the location of 
resources, the relative allurement of alternative investment opportuni­
ties, the strength and integrity of bureaucratic institutions, and the level 
of entrepreneurship in different countries at different times. Needless to 
say, much also depends on the magnitude of the development task and 
the rapidity with which it must be accomplished.
There are, however, “better” and “poorer” investment strategies for 
rural modernization, or at least there are some lessons to be learned from 
experience. There is, of course, the standard economic rule of thumb 
that advises investment to compensate for scarce factors—by rendering 
them more plentiful or more productive. Investing in mechanization, 
for example, compensates for scarce labor, investing in fertilizer raises 
the productivity of scarce land, investing in irrigation makes more 
efficient use of scarce water, sinking new wells makes water more 
abundant, and so on. Repeating this scarcity dictum would be a trivial 
exercise were it not for the fact that it is so often, and disappointingly, 
overlooked in many countries’ agricultural development programs, 
especially in those, like Pakistan’s, where mechanization in agriculture 
becomes a goal in itself, pursued without regard to land, labor, and 
capital ratios (see Chapter 8). The connection between factor scarcities 
and investment strategies therefore bears monitoring. If capital- 
intensive technology is subsidized at the same time that rural 
unemployment is growing, for instance, one may immediately suspect 
that advantaged groups, such as large landholders or urban elites, have 
substantial influence over the policy.
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The sequence of investment targets is also important. Early 
investments to improve the quality of human resources tend, for 
example, to correlate rather closely with later accomplishments in 
agricultural production and productivity. Government drives to 
promote literacy in the countryside before promoting more elaborate 
programs of technological change unquestionably contributed to 
progress in rural modernization in the United States, Europe, Japan, 
Taiwan, and China.‘9 The productive impact was particularly 
noteworthy in China, where, since the revolution of 1949, rural 
education has been combined with measures to improve the health and 
nutrition of the rural population. Similarly, early investment in 
transport and communications also appears to be directly linked to 
making rapid strides toward modernization. Overcoming bottlenecks in 
marketing and distribution by providing roads, railroads, and 
waterways, and integrating farmers into information networks via 
media and extension services, contribute significantly to the shift from 
subsistence agriculture to the specialization in production and new 
rural-urban divisions of labor which necessarily accompany moderniza­
tion. Furthermore, early investments in agronomic research have tended 
to speed rural modernization and to bring benefits which far outweigh 
the cost of research establishments. European accomplishments are a 
testament to this, the Dutch, Danish, and British especially. But this has 
also been the case for Japan, Canada, and the United States, as 
Hadwiger, Talbot, and Aall point out in Chapters 2 and 3. The point 
that fundamental investments to improve the environment for 
agriculture should come before specific drives to change technology, 
though obvious, is frequently overlooked in practice, as several of this 
volume’s essays demonstrate (e.g., the chapters by Schulz and Bates).
Institutions for Rural Modernization
As the countryside changes, farms and other producing units are 
altered in structure and function, markets are established or superseded, 
schools are founded, financial and credit facilities such as banks and 
cooperatives emerge, research and extension services are introduced, and 
farmers organize for economic and political action. A good deal has 
already been said about created and transformed infrastructure during 
rural modernization. What needs to be underlined is that promoting or 
suppressing various rural institutions and political movements is 
inevitably a component of official development policies. Moreover, 
building institutions that are appropriate to conditions in the 
countryside and complementary both to farmers’ needs and govern-
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mental objectives is a challenging problem for policymakers. Contrari­
wise, encouraging inappropriate or ill-designed institutions, such as 
many cooperatives in Africa in the 1960s proved to be, can be a formula 
for failure.
Agricultural production units assume considerable variety, and, 
although different kinds usually coexist in any country, governments 
tend to emphasize particular ones as vehicles for development. 
Compare, for example, American official encouragement of the “family 
farm” with Danish emphasis on the cooperative, Soviet promotion of 
the kolkholz or collective farm, Tanzanian ujamaa villages, and the 
elaborately tiered Chinese system of teams, brigades, and communes. 
Which institutions are deemed ideologically superior depends ulti­
mately on one’s leanings; which ones are appropriate vehicles for 
rapidly raising production and productivity depends on prevailing 
socio-cultural milieus and peculiar problems of resources and 
agronomy in given countries. Therefore, connections between kinds of 
producing units and kinds of development outcomes under varying 
contexts warrant monitoring. Much the same can be said for marketing 
institutions and credit facilities. Which contribute best to rural 
modernization? Traditional money lenders who charge usurious rates of 
interest but lend to even the poorest applicant? Modern banks that 
charge reasonable interest but lend to only some applicants? Or 
government ministries that charge nominal interest but lend for 
certain projects or to certain people only?
Farmers’ organizations and rural political associations deserve special 
attention in the analysis of rural modernization. Experience in Japan 
and Taiwan has shown that farmers’ associations can be exploited by 
governments as vehicles of modernization and carriers of technological 
change—in effect, as extensions of extension services. Conversely, as in 
the United States, an elite “subsystem” can capture the benefits of 
government largely for itself. With appropriately recruited and 
rewarded leadership, organizations can serve as instruments of 
surveillance and even agents to enforce compliance with official policies 
whether they favor current rural elites (as in Pakistan) or seek to displace 
them (as has occurred in Taiwan). More generally, farmers’ organiza­
tions have been channels through which information about the impacts 
of policies has flowed back to governments. As such they have proven 
essential to monitoring the effects of policy and crucial to the 
governmental capacity for timely adjustment. What is important for 
policy analysis, and what some of the following essays discuss is the 
extent to which governments have used or abused various farm 
organizations during rural development. Another question that is
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examined is what has resulted from their various attitudes and actions 
toward these organizations?
Finally, there are the institutions of technological innovations per 
se—research and extension services. It is fair to say that in every 
successful case of rural modernization that we are aware of government 
has been instrumental in fusing science and technology with 
agriculture. Even in the United States, where much of the technological 
development was in the private sector, federal and state investment in 
university research in agronomy and forestry was notable in the 
nineteenth century, when the land grant college network was 
established. The European tradition of public subsidization of 
agricultural research is, of course, much older, especially in plant and 
animal genetics in Russia, Prussia, and England. On the other hand, 
underemphasis on technology and low funding for agricultural research 
proved costly to both Indian and Chinese rural modernization during 
the 1950s, and insufficient research and technological innovation 
currently poses a major obstacle to rural development in Africa.
Extension services are equally important. If a government does not 
have the capacity to reach farmers directly, broad-gauged policies of 
rural development cannot be executed effectively or monitored 
adequately. Creating, maintaining, and effectively using an agricultural 
extension service appears to be an ingredient of every successful case of 
rural modernization. The absence or ineffectiveness of such structures 
contributed to the failure of the land reform efforts in Bolivia in the 
1950s (where newly “landed” peasants could not be shown how to use 
their resources) and to lagging production growth in some Indian states 
where agricultural extension agents preferred not to go into the 
countryside to meet farmers.
Encompassing all these institutional developments and a phe­
nomenon inextricably linked to agricultural and rural modernization is 
the expansion of government. All the kinds of changes in agriculture 
that we have reviewed have reflected or spurred *he expansion of state 
power in the countryside. There are two reasons for this. First, for 
traditional agricultural patterns to be supplanted by new rural 
institutions and practices—such as changed land-tenure systems or 
ownership distribution, increased credit, and new planting and 
marketing techniques—new (usually national) bases for authority and 
the settlement of conflicts are required and facilitated. That is, rural 
change can be the forerunner as well as the product of new government, 
as has happened in China. Second, new practices require expanded 
services—new typies of production inputs, regulation of diseases, rules to 
insure that wider markets operate securely, and an expansion of physical
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infrastructure, education, and extension work. The concern of 
comparative policy analysis is to determine which of these have worked 
successfully within varying contexts.
Policy Analysis and Comparative Case Studies
If we could know which combinations of official goals, degrees of 
intervention, political and administrative means, sources and uses of 
resources, and institutional emphases would yield successful rural 
modernization under various conditions, our capacity to prescribe 
would be a good deal more advanced than it is at present. Unfortunately, 
we have not yet accumulated the systematic knowledge required to guide 
governments toward courses of action that are simultaneously 
economically efficient, politically practicable, socioculturally appro­
priate, and agriculturally productive. That we lack this knowledge is a 
major justification for this volume and a recurrent theme of its chapters.
Implicitly or explicitly there are at least six issues on the policy 
agendas of countries undergoing rural modernization—land owner­
ship, degree of foreign control, scale biases of technology, rural versus 
urban biases, food versus nonfood production, and the instrumental 
versus the consummatory role of the rural populace in modernization. 
Some or all of the policy components identified earlier affect the 
practical resolution of each of these issues. Moreover, these issues are not 
independent of each other. Their resolution leads to the particular 
policy configuration of a given country. Of course, this “configuration” 
may or may not be stable over time and may or may not be conducive to 
growth in agricultural productivity. The case studies of six countries 
that follow, along with the three region-oriented analyses (Chapters 3, 
9, and 10), do not systematically review the manner in which each of 
these issues was resolved nor the apparent effects of each. Each chapter’s 
analysis does, however, examine some or most of these issues.^o
Land Ownership
Keith Griffin, among others, has argued that redistribution of land 
ownership would be the most effective means of reducing rural 
inequality and poverty and would increase production and total income 
in most contexts.^' He notes that small farmers tend to use land more 
completely and with higher yields and value added per hectare, as 
evidenced by studies in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Pakistan, India, and the Philippines.^^ Yet land reforms have 
frequently been inconsequential or outright failures, since much more 
than simply redistribution is required, including considerable political
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“costs.” Two questions really come up with respect to land: What form 
shall "ownership” take (i.e., shall individual communities or the 
government be given title), and how equitable should distribution be? 
Land ownership, as we see in the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese cases 
(Chapters 4 and 7) can be used most importantly for political ends, either 
to reinforce traditional rule or to revolutionize a society. When 
development goals (e.g., production growth with or without equity) are 
uppermost, economic rather than political calculations are presumably 
determinative. In any event, policy elements such as goals, resources, 
and institutions will all be affected by the way a regime settles the 
question of land ownership.
External Control
As we noted in several cases, notably Pakistan, Iran, Korea, and 
Taiwan, there has been a heavy reliance on external inputs and a 
tolerance of foreign control in agricultural development. Interestingly, 
both China and Taiwan have achieved considerable equity among their 
rural populace while following or being subject to quite opposite 
degrees of foreign control, especially since 1949. Furthermore, Cuba, 
which sought to reduce foreign control after 1960, has met with some 
difficulties as sugar production has declined and general dependence on 
the Soviet Union has replaced that previously enjoyed by the United 
States. The effects of foreign involvement and influence, therefore, 
generally depend on the context; for example, they can be said to have 
been favorable in Taiwan, mixed in Iran and Africa, and detrimental in 
Pakistan and China.
Technology
Different technologies carry with them different “biases”; in 
particular, most capital-intensive technologies, such as tractors, are not 
scale-neutral but rather give advantage to the larger, wealthier farmers 
(as the Pakrstan case makes clear; see Chapter 8). The most obvious 
“non-transferable” element in the American experience, according to 
Hadwiger and Talbot (Chaper 2), is our specific technology. Technol­
ogy “choice” has a major effect on the policy options available 
to developing countries. Different choices produced different options for 
the earlier developers of Europe, according to Aall (Chapter 3). More 
important than the technological inputs that capital investment can buy 
may be the forms of the technology: Whkh-kiads offarms-andfarmers' 
does it advantage? Is it scale-neutral or does it favor extensive or inten- 
sive cultivation? Even though the ejfects of the “green revolution” have 
been more scale-neutral than many expected, continuing technological
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innovation of the same kind in less agronomically favorable areas may 
well lead to wide-spread impoverishment and a more volatile political 
.role for rural areas.If pohcY_^cisiom^esolve the issueof Jcind of 
technology in favor of ^p^e j^ith a Jar^ farm bias~(usually through 
subsidies and provision of services for farm commodities), then the 
“choice” of equitable land distribution would work at cross-purposes to 
the goal of increased production. Hence, the effect of technology may be 
‘ as important for equity as for production if it favors large landowners for 
certain regions to the absolute disadvantage of others.
Rural Versus Urban
A fourth issue for policy resolution is the question of whether to favor 
rural or urban populaces.As we noted earlier, all development 
involves intersectoral stimulalion—industry in towns and agriculture 
in the~ countryside advance together, as Aall notes pointedly for 
England. However, production in one sector may be supported by the 
I other through direct_intersectoraE transfers^-as well, usually through 
! goyem^mejiLtaxes. Classically, the city has advanced at the expense of the 
rural population, whether through cheap-food-p&licies, confiscatiomof 
I export earnings, or other causes. This pattern, whether found in the 
' UnTted'Sfates, the Soviet Union, or Ghana, is no longer likely to yield 
the same growth effects. And in the wake of such intersectoral transfers, 
the basis for rural tensions, given the diffusion of expectations, is now 
much greater. Bates’s discussion of the discontent among Ghanaian 
cocoa growers (Chapter 9) illustrates this point.
Food Versus Nonfood
A fifth issue is whether food self-sufficiency should be encouraged 
through extra-market incentives. Iran and Korea, with their declining 
food production compared to demand, have chosen to subsidize 
consumer prices, though not totally at producers’ expense. The 
gotrieniment has_instead paid a subsidy to maintain a differential 
between higher farm and lower urban retail prices. Other related 
policies ~3o harm farmers. For instance, when higher earning export 
crops or cheaper food imports (e.g., food aid) create incentives to move 
away from food production, this shift will also affect the urban-rural 
terms of trade because cheaper foad.4Dric£S_ggn£raily favor the urban 
population. Policies in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere favoring-export 
crops and/or imported extensive-type technologies for food production 
are surprising in the wake of the global food shortages of 1973-74 and the 
projections of substantial and growing food deficits in less developed 
countries as a whole—expected to be 185 million tons by 1990, up from
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21 million tons in 1975.25 Nicholson and Esseks (Chapter 10) discuss a 
number of the problems food shortages pose for policy makers in 
developing countries.
Role of the Rural Populace
A final issue is the political role played by the rural populace in policy 
making. Modernization through revolution has been advanced as 
rural “classes” aided revolutionary efforts in China, Russia, Cuba, 
and elsewhere (see Bernstein, Chapter 4).2s At the opposite ex­
treme, the countryside may be viewed as politically impotent, serving 
prinr^^lly ac a cnppUpr nf capital through “prof^” captured bv the 
government to support urban industrialization. In the Soviet Union, the 
Russians may have played both these roles from 1917 through 1937. The 
I goals of policies, of course, are important in reflecting or establishing 
I these alternative roles in modernization. At one extreme the well-being 
of the rural populace may be regarded as an end in itself and, hence, 
growth in their consumption becomes a critical yardstick for evaluating 
policy. At the other extreme, rural people are seen as an instrument of 
production whose immiscibility is irrelevant to policy evolution, except 
as it may have a negative effect on production or political stability.
Although some consultants believe that they can knowledgeably and 
confidently offer advice on these issues, we recommend caution. There is 
at present a respected body of theoretical knowledge concerned with the 
economics of development and an equally impressive body in the fields 
of theoretical and applied agronomy and the cognate sciences. Drawing 
on these helps achieve a better and more systematic understanding of 
rural modernization but can hardly complete the intellectual task, since, 
as noted earlier, they fail to take into account the economic, social, and 
culmral factors that shape politics and affect policy miplementation. In 
contrast to theoretical scientific analyses, there is also a wealth of 
practical experience with agricultural modernization—scores of cases, 
historical and contemporary, libraries of description, documentation, 
anecdotal insights, and case-study materials that can be mined by 
scholars in the search for a more complete and systematic understanding 
of relationships between public policies and rural transformation. What 
these case analyses can show is that under particular conditions certain 
combinations of policy components produced particular results—some 
good, some bad. Multiplying cases and reconfirming relationships 
increases the generality of the findings, and, ultimately, such 
comparative research and inductive logic can yield systematic knowl­
edge. This book’s collection of case studies of rural modernization is a 
preliminary and very small step in the direction of such knowledge. We
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certainly do not recommend that Third World governments delay efforts 
at agricultural development while scholars accumulate more complete 
knowledge about the process. There is no time for this. We do suggest 
that governmental efforts will become more successful as our 
understanding becomes more complete and contextually relevant. 
There is an urgency, then, in the task that we have proposed to our 
colleagues and begun work on in the chapters of this volume.
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